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By THoMAS

W

SHELTON*

treatment and untechnical language are helpful in discussing the application of the spirit, as contrasted
with the letter of the law. A layman's views may be best expressed in lay language. Because they set out in bas-relief two essential features in the administration of justice, proposed to be
discussed, two questions may be asked. Is it the function of the
courts to administer justice or to follow technicalities" Where
no principle is involved, should a court feel obliged to obey the
demands of justice, or the rules of procedure? If these questions,
whether viewed in the abstract or with reference to concrete
cases, stimulate the campaign against a prevalent judicial mental
status leading to a technical administration of justice, the object
intended will have been achieved.
Preceding an attempt to answer the question in the light of
practical reason, there should be quoted the efforts of Congress,
probably, to coerce the courts and certainly to relieve them from
obligations to observe technicalities
"On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or
motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court
shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard, to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."'
That salutary portion of the statute became law on February
26, 1919 And there is still another statute
"No summons, writ, declaration, return, process, judgment,
or other proceedings in civil causes, in any court of the United
States, shall be abated, arrested, quashed, or reversed for any defect or want of form but such court shall proceed and give judgment according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall
appear to it, without regarding any such defect, or want of form,
except those which, in cases of demurrer, the party demurring specially sets down, together with his demurrer, as the case thereof
and such court shall amend everl such defect and want of form,
other than those which the party demurring so expresses, and may
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at any time permit either of the parties to amend any defect in the
process or pleadings, upon such conditions
as it shall, in its dis'2
cretion and by its rules, prescribe."
These statutes are monuments to the persistent labor of the
American Bar Association who pursued a reluctant Congress for
years and not to the enterprise of Congress. Their history and
obvious necessity are not creditable to lawyers, Congress or the
courts. Nor was it just to allow the judges and lawyers to carry
the blame for the miscarriages that these statutes were designed
to prevent, until Congress would permit rules of court. They are
still viewed by some reactionary judges as procedural solecisins.
It is suggested that the responsibility rests now wholly upon the
judges, for there is hardly room for "interpretation" or the excuse
of lack of power, as chaotic as are present procedural conditions.
Putting to one side the questionableness of legislative coercion, in the face of the refusal of Congress to permit the modernization of the court, and commending so salutary and necessary an
aid to justice, one finds support for the quoted statutes in the
very genius of and reason for pleading, practice and procedure.
Pleading and procedure are normally but a means to an end in the
consecrated search for justice, as we have endeavored to show and
as the American Bar Association contends. This is now a fixed
principle. As such they are of first importance, otherwise they
are obstructions. There is no possible excuse for the defeat of
justice through upholding a simple court-made rule of procedure.
however binding upon the court a statutory rule may have been
until the enactment of the federal statute just quoted. Many of
the states have adopted similar statutes.
An Arkansas case3 presents an outstanding illustration of voluntary hobbling of justice giving as an excuse its inability to act.
The trial judge apparently coerced a jury into reaching a verdict.
Unfortunately counsel failed to "except" in the formal manner
required by a widely prevailing rule, with stated reasons therefor
and the appellate court would not sua sponte observe the wrong and
correct it. That the conduct of the trial judge was prejudicial and
reversible error and that the appellate judges knew of the transgression and deliberately closed their eyes, the supreme court itself
concedes by saying "We are all of the opinion that the remark
was highly improper and should not have been made." There will
be few to disagree that a verdict obtained by such methods does
228 U. S. C. A. sec. 777 2 Mason's Code, tit. 28 sec. 777
3Holmes v. State, (1922) 153 Ark. 339, 240 S. W 425.
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not recommend itself. It is very earnestly protested, if a judge
persists in that character, that the penalty thus inflicted upon a
helpless litigant or an unfortunate lawyer is not justified by the
offense of oversight or of ignorance of which they were guilty It
is a forfeiture of liberty or property of a helpless layman innocent
of wrong, and equity looks with disfavor on a forfeiture. Moreover, it was not a trial of an issue of fact and law between the
parties litigant, but of the vigilance or wit of a lawyer. Courts
were not created for that purpose.
These circumstances, it strongly appeals, presented to the
court a rare opportunity to brush aside the technicality that stood
between it and the justice that laymen think can be found in courts
and that must be found in them. That is the only policy that will
command respect for the courts or justify their existence, in the
estimation of laymen. Laymen are sportsmanlike losers in a fair
contest, but protesting dissenters against deprivation by techimcalities. But it is the reason given that will be least understood by
the lay public. The majority of the court ruled that the lapse was
waived when appellant failed to object. Passing that by as a necessary fiction of law, if the rule be recognized as binding upon the
court, the result is that the conduct of counsel, instead of the law
and the facts, became the measure of justice in that court. By the
same token it is to be assumed that prejudicial misconduct would
likewise be considered as waived, if not formally excepted to with
reasons therefor. Let us suppose that the appellant did waive for
whatever reason, and that is a far fetched conclusion to a layman,
the impeding of justice was not thereby cured, and that is the point.
The state is a third party to all civil actions and was the complainant in the cited criminal prosecution. Based on the premise that
it is as much the duty of the state to protect as to punish, it is the
duty of some agency of the government, and it ought to be the
first duty of an appellate court, to supervise trials on review and
see to the proper functioning of the trial courts to the end that
justice may be administered. It is such a sacred duty that neither
waiver, negligence nor ignorance should be allowed to limit the
interference of an appellate court to that end. By the same reasoning the prejudicial oversight of counsel should be remedied,
just as should the prejudicial oversight of the judge, whenever
possible. Any other oversight should be ignored, when justice has
been done. In other words, no ludgnent should be entered except
upon the law and the facts and the justice of the case. There is
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no possible justification in a court of justice for any other disposition of a case.

It will be seen that earnest contention is being made for the
application of the spirit of the statutes just quoted that, in some
way, all omissions and errors may be corrected by appellate courts,
instead of allowing them to become decisive of the case. It iiatters not whether they were overlooked, seen and not excepted to,
or seen and improperly excepted to. That this means a substantial
revolution in common law states and some others is obvious, but
what justice demands is what ought to be done and what will he
done in time. Technical rulings, like the ancient bills of exception,
errors which so long muffled the eyes and ears of appellate
judges, find their roots in the ancient and abandoned common law
practices that are inbedded in the mind of every well trained lawyer, but no longer respected in England the home of their origin.
They are rapidly being outlawed in America. Lest we become discouraged it was not so long ago that a case improperly brought in
equity instead of law was thrown entirely out of the courts, and
judgments were reversed because of the omission of the article
"the" from an indictment. It was only in 1919 that Congress forbade judgments on technicalities. Surely it is not necessary that the
courts shall be legislated into the spirit of justice. A right sort of
precedent is needed.
It is so shocking to the sensibilities that a layman searches
for justification in any court for its refusal to correct a conceded
wrong, or for the policy of a court to allow its measure of justice
to be limited by the inefficient conduct of counsel, who are its
officers. That is precisely what happens. It is to be regretted that
a mandatory record requires the limitations and restrictions of
some fixed rules of pleading, procedure and practice, for that
which is not juridically presented cannot be judicially decided. But
that should be the limit of the absolutism of the mandatory record.
That a mandatory record can be presented in America with technicalities of procedure and practice brushed aside, as well as in
England and Canada, will not be denied by any American judge or
lawyer When statutory procedure prevents justice, it is the duty
of the judges to inform the Legislature directly or through the
organized Bar, and seek relief. In a great many states the appellate courts have the necessary power. The creation of judicial
councils and Rules Commissions is a wholesome judicial response.
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Another phase of this matter is that the public measures only
by the results produced by the courts, without having any idea of
or interest in the manner in which it is achieved. This is a most
yital social element of which the courts should never be unmindful.
Courts are the servants of the people and were set up by them for
one specific purpose, and that is to administer substantial justice.
While the courts may make rules for their orderly regulation, they
may not lessen their own obvious duty or power to administer
justice. It is worth while to repeat here that it is said in Proverbs 4 that "a righteous man failing in his cause before his adversary is as a troubled fountain and a corrupt spring." Lord
Bacon' concluded "and surely there be also that turn it into vinegar; for injustice maketh it bitter, and delays make it sour." The
judge who overlooks this patent factor in the social compact is
inviting disaster to himself, the courts and to the government.
Laymen will seek to destroy any agency that fails to produce common sense results or works wrongs. A fine example was the threatened "recall of judges" that had to be resisted by the American
Bar Association, through an organized national campaign of education, entailing the expenditure of valuable time and wealth.
Encouraged by Theodore Roosevelt's attitude in its favor, the
agitators did not fail to use it in support of their propaganda
against the courts. As we have seen, it is all so entirely unnecessary, if the courts would recognize the entire actual record m a
common sense way, instead of the technical record of the discarded common law practice. It is now very much a question of
judicial mental attitude and it is the purpose of this paper respectfully to bring home that fact.
Another thought mentioned elsewhere protrudes itself. Are
the lawyers sufficiently conscious of their function as officers of
the court to make possible the suggested improvements? If they
resist, will the judges be courageous enough to overcome it? Is it
not a fact that the attitude of the American lawyer is to trap the
judge, instead of help and aid him, the corollary to which is the
mental attitude of the judge of being on the defensive? There is
a lack of cooperation. Has not this influence much to do with
the narrow technical rulings of the court ? In other words do the
lawyers as officers of the court sworn like the judges, approach the
seat of justice as aids or as enemies" There will not likely be a
4XXX 26.
sEssay LVI.
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division of opinion on that score amongst thoughtful lawyers and
judges. But do they realize the seriousness and evil results of
such a status and its reflection upon a noble profession?
With the statutory exception previously quoted, the obligation
of the oath of qualification to uphold all statutes-both the substantive and the adjective law-does justify the lawyer's lack of
cooperation as to statutory procedure and pleading. He is compelled to recognize the rigid thongs with which the Congress and
Legislature bind and restrict both him and the court to a fixed
course, though injustice be done in their presence, which is the
strongest possible argument for a procedural change to the policy
of the English and Canadian courts, of simple rules.
We have obviously digressed in introducing the lawyers in
order to complete the trial atmosphere, for the judge and the lawyer are inseparable in the administration of justice. They must
cooperate. Moreover, in the retirement of his home where tls
may be read, the lawyer as well as the judge is a citizen with a
highly trained mind, an alert conscience, a knowledge of government, a keen sense of the public concept of the courts and a fine
measure of his public duty It is to that good citizen, and not to
the enslaved counsel and a legislative and precedent bound judge,
that an appeal is made to think less technically in the trial of cases.

